HOW BRITAIN SOUGHT TO THWART J&K’S ACCESSION TO INDIA

 

My last blog, based on a book in Malayalam, written by a 1947 IAS official, late Shri MKK Nair, has precipitated quite a controversy. There have been comments from the Congress Camp that Nair’s report about a clash between Nehru and Patel on the issue of armed action against the Nizam is all baseless. Fact is that even on sending the army into J&K following the attack on J&K by tribesmen and Pakistan in 1947, Nehru had similar reservations.

Going through Rediff on The Net, I have come across a very interesting interview Sam Manekshaw, the first Field Marshal in the Indian Army had with Prem Shankar Jha. Manekshaw, in those early years of independence, was a colonel who was chosen to accompany V.P. Menon to Kashmir when V.P. was proceeding to that state to secure J & K’s Accession to India. Col. Manekshaw’s version as recorded by Prem Shankar Jha runs as follows :

At about 2.30 in the afternoon, General Sir Roy Bucher walked into my room and said, ‘Eh, you, go and pick up your toothbrush. You are going to Srinagar with V P Menon. The flight will take off at about 4 o’clock’. I said, ‘Why me, Sir?’

‘Because we are worried about the military situation. V P Menon is going there to get the accession from the Maharaja and Mahajan.’ I flew in with V P Menon in a Dakota. Wing Commander Dewan, who was then Squadron Leader Dewan, was also there. But his job did not have anything to do with assessing the military situation. He was sent by the Air Force because it was the Air Force which was flying us in.’

Since I was in the Directorate of Military Operations, and was responsible for current operations all over India, West Frontier, the Punjab, and elsewhere, I knew what the situation in Kashmir was. I knew that the tribesmen had come in - initially only the tribesmen - supported by the Pakistanis.

Fortunately for us, and for Kashmir, they were busy raiding, raping all along. In Baramulla they killed Colonel D O T Dykes. Dykes and I were of the same seniority. We did our first year’s attachment with the Royal Scots in Lahore, way back in 1934-5. Tom went to the Sikh regiment. I went to the Frontier Force regiment. We’d lost contact with each other. He’d become a lieutenant colonel. I’d become a full colonel.

Tom and his wife were holidaying in Baramulla when the tribesmen killed them.

The Maharaja’s forces were 50 per cent Muslim and 50 per cent Dogra.

The Muslim elements had revolted and joined the Pakistani forces. This was the broad military situation. The tribesmen were believed to be about 7 to 9 kilometers from Srinagar. I was sent in to get the precise military situation. The army knew that if we had to send soldiers, we would have to fly them in. Therefore, a few days before, we had made arrangements for aircraft and for soldiers to be ready.

 

But we couldn’t fly them in until the state of Kashmir had acceded to India. From the political side, Sardar Patel and V P Menon had been dealing with Mahajan and the Maharaja, and the idea was that V.P Menon would get the Accession, I would bring back the military appreciation and report to the government. The troops were already at the airport, ready to be flown in. Air Chief Marshall Elmhurst was the air chief and he had made arrangements for the aircraft from civil and military sources.

Anyway, we were flown in. We went to Srinagar. We went to the palace. I have never seen such disorganisation in my life. The Maharaja was running about from one room to the other. I have never seen so much jewellery in my life - pearl necklaces, ruby things, lying in one room; packing here, there, everywhere. There was a convoy of vehicles.

The Maharaja was coming out of one room, and going into another saying, ‘Alright, if India doesn’t help, I will go and join my troops and fight (it) out’.

I couldn’t restrain myself, and said, ‘That will raise their morale sir’. Eventually, I also got the military situation from everybody around us, asking what the hell was happening, and discovered that the tribesmen were about seven or nine kilometres from what was then that horrible little airfield.

V P Menon was in the meantime discussing with Mahajan and the Maharaja. Eventually the Maharaja signed the accession papers and we flew back in the Dakota late at night. There were no night facilities, and the people who were helping us to fly back, to light the airfield, were Sheikh Abdullah, Kasimsahib, Sadiqsahib, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, D P Dhar with pine torches, and we flew back to Delhi. I can’t remember the exact time. It must have been 3 o’clock or 4 o’clock in the morning.

(On arriving at Delhi) the first thing I did was to go and report to Sir Roy Bucher. He said, ‘Eh, you, go and shave and clean up. There is a cabinet meeting at 9 o’clock. I will pick you up and take you there.’ So I went home, shaved, dressed, etc. and Roy Bucher picked me up, and we went to the cabinet meeting.

The cabinet meeting was presided by Mountbatten. There was Jawaharlal Nehru, there was Sardar Patel, there was Sardar Baldev Singh. There were other ministers whom I did not know and did not want to know, because I had nothing to do with them. Sardar Baldev Singh I knew because he was the minister for defence, and I knew Sardar Patel, because Patel would insist that V P Menon take me with him to the various states.

Almost every morning the Sardar would sent for V P, H M Patel and myself. While Maniben (Patel’s daughter and de facto secretary) would sit cross-legged with a Parker fountain pen taking notes, Patel would say, ‘V P, I want Baroda. Take him with you.’ I was the bogeyman. So I got to know the Sardar very well.

At the morning meeting he handed over the (Accession) thing. Mountbatten turned around and said, ‘come on Manekji (He called me Manekji instead of Manekshaw), what is the military situation?’ I gave him the military situation, and told him that unless we flew in troops immediately, we would have lost Srinagar, because going by road would take days, and once the tribesmen got to the airport and Srinagar, we couldn’t fly troops in. Everything was ready at the airport.

As usual Nehru talked about the United Nations, Russia, Africa, God almighty, everybody, until Sardar Patel lost his temper. He said, ‘Jawaharlal, do you want Kashmir, or do you want to give it away’. He (Nehru) said,’ Of course, I want Kashmir. Then he (Patel) said ‘Please give your orders’. And before he could say anything Sardar Patel turned to me and said, ‘You have got your orders’.

I walked out, and we started flying in troops at about 11 o’clock or 12 o’clock. I think it was the Sikh regiment under Ranjit Rai that was the first lot to be flown in. And then we continued flying troops in. That is all I know about what happened. Then all the fighting took place. I became a brigadier, and became director of military operations and also if you will see the first signal to be signed ordering the cease-fire on 1 January (1949) had been signed by Colonel Manekshaw on behalf of C-in-C India, General Sir Roy Bucher. That must be lying in the Military Operations Directorate.

 * * *

After my blogpost of November 5 was circulated a friend told me that I had misspelt the name of Gen. Bucher.  I corrected it by adding a footnote to my blog.

But shortly thereafter, I looked up at a website on Gen. Sir Roy Bucher and discovered in the write-up under his name that in the years 1946-47 as well as during the Indo-Pak war of 1947-48 it was Gen. Bucher who was the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army.

The Indo-Pak war of 1947 was a war in which Jammu and Kashmir state had been invaded by tribesmen as well as Pakistani soldiers, all led by army officials.  Gen. Bucher’s website says:

The Indo-Pak war of 1947-48 was unique in modern military history because it is the only war fought by two modern armies (belonging to two different countries), which were both commanded by British generals. The Commander-in-chief (C-in-C) of the Indian Army was General Sir Roy Bucher, and his Pakistani counterpart was General Douglas Gracey. All three services in India and Pakistan were commanded by British officers.

But by 1948, Nehru had come around to the conclusion that this was not an immediately feasible proposition. The C-in-C, General Bucher, advised him that militarily it was not possible to establish control over the entire territory of Jammu & Kashmir, with the British also supporting Pakistan.  Pakistan suspected the Maharaja wanted to accede to India and tried to pre-empt his decision by forcibly seizing the state.

A cabinet meeting was organised for September 12th to take a final decision. Among those who attended were Prime Minister Nehru, Home Minister Patel, Defence Minister Baldev Singh, Gopalaswamy Iyengar, General Bucher, Lt. Gen. (later Field Marshal and C-in-C, IA) K M Cariappa and Air Marshal Sir Thomas W. Elmhirst (C-in-C, IAF).

As the decision was being finalised, Gen. Bucher stood up and said, “Gentlemen, you have taken a decision in a difficult matter.  I must give you my warning. We are also committed in Kashmir.  We cannot say how long it will take so we will end up having two operations on our hands.  This is not advisable, so as your C-in-C I ask you not to start the operations.”  He further offered his resignation if his advice was not heeded.

There was a silence while a distressed and worried Nehru looked around.  Patel replied, “You may resign General Bucher, but the police action will start tomorrow.” An angry General Bucher stormed out, and coincidentally the next few days saw a rise in the Kashmir operations. 

General Sir Roy Bucher and Lady Bucher with Shri C. Rajagopalachari

and Commander-in-Chief, General K.M. Cariappa at Rashtrapati Bhavan

India’s own first C-in-C in January 1949 was General Cariappa.  One of the things that greatly concerned the British at the closing stage of this war was that General Cariappa was taking initiatives that General Sir Roy Bucher could not control. The British did not want an Indo-Pak war. They were conscious that hostilities would break out and had issued secret orders to all British officers ‘to stand down’ in the event of a war. These officers were told they could resign their commission or function in an advisory capacity. 

The British clearly did not want the whole of Jammu & Kashmir to go to India. There was a widespread feeling in London that if India was in control of areas contiguous to Pakistan, the latter would not survive.

The top-secret cables exchanged between the British missions in India and Pakistan, and Whitehall, tell the true story. The C-in-C was receiving instructions from the British High Commission in New Delhi. Nehru had decided to strike at the bases of the raiders in Pakistan but Mountbatten opposed this.

L.K. ADVANI

New Delhi

November 7, 2013